Professor Benston attacks 1 our defense 2 of the principle of City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 3 that employers must use sexually integrated actuarial tables in employer-sponsored insurance plans. 4 Despite the imposing bulk of his essay, Benston contributes little new evidence to the debate. He explicitly assumes his legal conclu-* The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of Ingrid Waldron and the research assistance of Richard G. Rogers. In accord with scientific custom, the authors' names are in alphabetical order to indicate equal responsibility.
sion 5 and begs other fundamental questions in equally obvious ways. 6 His lengthy discourse on the characteristics of insurance differs only slightly from Professor Kimball's earlier explanation. His demographic evidence is fully consistent with the evidence and arguments we presented, 8 despite his contrary assertions. 9 What is new in Benston's approach is the explicitness and scope of his definition of nondiscrimination. He has melded the unrelated policies of group equality and efficiency, which constituted the bases for earlier attacks on Manhart, 10 and has carried the combination to its logical extreme. Incredibly, his response states that sex and race discrimination are no different from any other kind of discrimination." He believes that nondiscrimination requires that average group differences be taken into account whenever it is efficient to do so, 2 but he offers no legal analysis to support this startling reinterpretation of federal law. Nothing in his article casts doubt upon our original conclusions.
I. BENSTON'S VISION OF FAIRNESS
Benston's vision of fairness, one that probably accounts for much of the hostility to Manhart, runs roughly as follows. Compare a man and a womdn retiring at age sixty-five with equal total pension contributions over the course of their careers. If the average number of additional years beyond age sixty-five that previous women have lived is eighteen, but the average additional years that men have lived is fourteen, it is unfair to pay these two individuals the same periodic benefits. 8 All other things being equal, we should expect the woman to live four years longer than the man, and we should calculate her disbursements on the assumption that her fund will have to last that much longer. She should have no complaint, even if she were to die the very next day, because she will have obtained an equal expected value at the beginning. Professor Kimball has added that many men would gladly trade places with women and give up higher periodic annuity payments in exchange for the chance of living longer. 1 4 The free market is said to guarantee this equal expected value, 15 and if annuities are priced to reflect the best prediction of life expectancy that is administratively feasible, the purchaser's subjective expectation of value is said to equal or exceed the price paid. 6 By viewing fairness in this way, Benston fundamentally misconceives the basic principles of civil rights law. He also makes one of two elementary errors of logic: either he confuses causation with correlation, or he misunderstands the significance of noncausal correlation. We consider the logical error first, and the legal principles second.
A. Correlation and the Causes of Mortality
The mischief caused by confusing causation with correlation is illustrated by a famous study of sex discrimination in admission to Berkeley graduate programs. 17 Men had a much higher admission rate than women. One tends, as the authors noted,'" to jump to the conclusion that some sort of discrimination was afoot, that "all other things being equal," a man had a higher chance of being admitted because of his gender. In fact, no such discrimination existed. Instead, women tended to apply to departments with low admission rates.' 9 The chances of success for men and women were identical once all other things were in fact made equal by controlling for the truly causative factor, the department to which the application was directed. Whatever advantages there might have been in being male, they did not ensure a spot in graduate school.
This phenomenon, sometimes referred to as Newcomb's paradox, 20 can arise whenever statistical predictions are made, includ-ing predictions made in the calculation of insurance benefits. Assume, for example, that self-destructive behavior causes higher mortality after age sixty-five, with the hypothetical results shown in Table A If we were to look only at the bottom row of Table A , all we would see is that a woman's life expectancy appears longer than a man's. It would be tempting to assume the existence of a connection between sex and life expectancy that will cause a man to live four fewer years than a similarly situated woman. Benston makes exactly this mistake, moving from statements about average mortality differences to assertions that, "all other things being equal," a woman should live longer than a man. 22 Chicago Law Review) . For criticisms of the use of correlation-based prediction schemes that lack plausible causal support, see Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1444-47 (1979) . 21 These are fictitious data, chosen solely for arithmetic simplicity to clarify the conceptual issues. They simplify only slightly, however, what we know about the causes of sex mortality differentials ("SMDs"), because self-destructive behavior by men explains much of the SMD in the United States. Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 552-53.
"Benston, supra note 1, at 506, 509. His arguments about the causes of SMIDs come much later, see id. at 519-25, and do not support his claims about what would happen if all other things were equal, see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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The University of Chicago Law Review Manhart's critics argue that it is impractical to take account of factors other than gender; 23 they claim that self-destructive behavior, though known to affect life expectancy, is an inefficient predictor because it is expensive to monitor. 24 We have no reason to question these claims, because even if true they say nothing about the choice between the remaining alternatives. Those alternatives are either to use sex as the sole predictor or to pool all available data without differentiation as to sex or behavior. 25 Benston argues that it is unfair and, in fact, illegal to use aggregate data rather than sex-distinct mortality tables. 6 It is hard to understand why the use of merged-gender mortality tables is unfair to men. It has a disparate impact 2 7 on men as a group 28 because it disadvantages self-destructors, and more men than women are self-destructors. 2 1 The total annuity payout to the 500 hypothetical men in Table A would be less than the total amount paid to the 500 women because the total number of years the men would live would be less. 30 But are men, especially nonself-destructors, entitled to cash in on the fact that many of their sex self-destruct, and is this "entitlement" one that rises to the level of a right protected by Title VII? 1 There is no merit in Ben-3 See, e.g., Benston, supra note 1, at 517-19, 530-31; Kimball, supra note 7, at 119-20.
Smoking, however, is often considered in the calculation of life insurance premiums. Fair Insurance Practices Act: Hearings on S. 2204 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33 (1982 Civil rights law has distinguished sharply disparate treatment from disparate impact. An employer engages in disparate treatment when he deliberately treats a woman and a man differently because of their sex; he causes a disparate impact when he treats his employees in a way that is facially neutral with respect to race and sex, but that adversely affects a larger proportion of one race or sex than the other. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) ; Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 508-11.
Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 510-11. 2" Using the hypothetical data from the last line of Table A and assuming retirement at age 65, the expected number of payment years for the 500 men would be 7000, compared to 9000 for the women.
31 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 2000e-17 ( & Supp. V 1981 . For a discussion of Title VII policy and the choice between disparate treatment and disparate impact in the area of pension benefits, see infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
ston's sweeping claim that men are discriminated against whenever sex is an efficient predictor but is not used. 2 When sex is used to calculate pension contributions or benefits, the woman's complaint is clear. It is false to claim, as Benston does, 33 that a woman receives subjective value equal to that which a man receives. She knows subjectively that an identically situated man has an equal life expectancy but gets higher periodic benefits. The reason may be that the insurance company lacks inexpensive access to accurate information concerning its annuitants' habits, but her understanding of the company's perspective does not increase her subjective valuation of the periodic benefits.
Benston would assure the woman that it is fair to treat her as the average woman because her benefits are based on "her" individual life expectancy. He asserts that life expectancy is an individual characteristic 4 and that the value of any particular annuity to a woman is greater than its value to a similarly situated man. 3 This argument was raised originally by Professor Kimball, 6 refuted in some detail by us, 3 7 and largely conceded in Kimball's reply.' Ignoring the substantial prior development of this issue, Benston simply asserts that life expectancy is "a characteristic shared by every individual woman," 39 without a word of analysis to support his conclusion. Yet as we have shown, statisticians deny the possibility of "true" individual expectancies. 4°3 2 Benston repeats this assertion at numerous points in his article. See Benston, supra note 1, at 505-06, 508-11, 512, 525, 542. 33 See id. at 502-03, 505-06. The "subjective value" argument is fallacious even apart from a Title VII context. For example, a terminally ill insured, male or female, will not get true subjective value from an annuity that does not take illness into account in calculating benefits. Neither the insurance company's own prediction of expectancy nor other insurance companies' unwillingness to offer better rates will influence the purchaser's subjective value. Further, no inference about subjective value can be drawn from the fact of purchase when the purchase is involuntary, as is often the case in an employment context. But Benston's subjective value argument at least avoids Kimball's error of assuming that the value to the employee always equals the cost to the employer. Compare Kimball, supra note 7, at 100-01 with Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 518 n.54 and Benston, supra note 1, at 504.
Benston, supra note 1, at 506 n.43, 507. Id. at 497-98. 'e Kimball, supra note 7, at 101-02.
7 Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 511-14. Benston could offer the same correlation-based justification of individual expectancy to a woman refused credit on the ground that women have been poor credit risks in the past. Her "own" arithmetically calculated credit rating that took sex into account would injure her ability to compete in the credit market. 41 Similarly, one could deny parole to a black while granting the parole request of a similarly situated white, so long as it could be shown that recidivism correlates with race. 2 College admissions officials could use ethnicity as a factor to predict the grade-point averages of applicants, if in fact the two were shown to be correlated. In the cases posited, sex, race, and ethnicity would be "efficient" predictors because they are inexpensive selection criteria to administer. In addition, each person would be given the benefit of his or her true "individual expectancy" in exactly the same sense that Benston asserts annuitants are given the benefit of their "individual" expectancies. That is, each person would be treated as the average member of his or her racial, sexual, or ethnic group. 43 Benston's obvious response is to say that sex itself is the primary cause of the sex mortality *differential ("SMD"), 4 but even his data do not support that conclusion. More important, he cannot rely on claims of a causal connection between life expectancy and gender because ultimately his argument depends on efficiency considerations rather than on causation. He repeatedly states that efficient predictors, not causally related predictors, must be used, 45 and he finds it unnecessary for insurance predictions to be 41 Fortunately, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976), prohibits such discrimination. 4' In response to these hypothetical situations, Benston concedes that paramount social concerns sometimes may override the use of efficient predictors. See Benston, supra note 11, at 259 n.30. We would argue that sexual equality is a paramount social concern. 4 "Any time that group statistics are calculated on the basis of gender, they can be rephrased ks "individual characteristics that are the same for all members of a given gender." Benston, supra note 1, at 507. We make an "individual" prediction whenever we attribute a group stereotype to an individual. To attribute to Sally Smith, on the basis of her sex, an inability to supervise male subordinates or a predisposition to quit work and have children is to make an individual prediction about Smith, a prediction that is "the same for all members of a given gender." It is nonetheless invidious and is no different from the predictions made for annuities in sex-distinct mortality tables or the examples posited in text.
" Benston, supra note 1, at 519-25; see also Benston, supra note 11, at 271. He seems to concede that he has the burden of proof on this issue. Benston, supra note 1, at 493 ("I accept the burden of showing that insurers' use of sex-distinct mortality tables for calculating the benefits from annuities and life insurance is necessary to avoid unfair treatment of people with respect to their gender."). 45 See, e.g., Benston, supra note 1, at 505-06, 508-13, 524, 542. In the introduction to his analysis of the demographic data, he says, "[t]he essential question that must be consid-
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Rejoinder to Professor Benston grounded in theory." In his response, he agrees with us that the issue of a biological or genetic advantage is legally irrelevant. 4 7 Because Benston is interested only in efficiency, he concludes that an unregulated insurance market will reach the "fair" result. 48 To the extent that the market works, it pressures insurers into using the most efficient predictor regardless of whether there is a causal connection between predictor and risk predicted. 49 An insurer would like to offer lower rates to self-destructors in order to capture that segment of the annuity market, but Benston observes that the administrative costs of gathering information and monitoring insureds are prohibitive. 50 Sex, however, is an efficient predictor, at least in the short run, 5 " because it can be considered inexpensively. By offering males lower rates, insurers can maximize sales to self-destructors. 2 The insurer is willing to pay an unavoidable windfall to non-self-destructive men, and the disadvantage to self-destructing women (of higher rates) is relevant to the insurer only if some other company can lure their business away. But it is equally expensive for other insurers to base their rates on factors such as self-destructive behavior. The market pressures all insurers to use sex, not because it is relevant in and of itself, but because it is the cheapest predictive variable available.
The same market forces might pressure an employer into using race, sex, or religion in other types of employment decisions, merely because these factors are cheap to administer and are correlated with characteristics the employer wishes to predict. For example, an employer wishing to avoid employees who abuse drugs ered now is whether the data on gender-related life expectancy qualify as efficient estimators of the risk of death." Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
4s "It is preferable that the postulated relationship be grounded in a theory that efficiently predicts the effect of changed circumstances on life expectancy. But this is not necessary if past relationships have been stable and previous predictions accurate." Id. at 514. 4,Benston, supra note 11, at 267. " Benston, supra note 1, at 498, 529-32.
" We adhere to our view that insurance markets do not foster competition to the benefit of consumers, especially with respect to employer-sponsored plans. Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 531 n.125. In the employment context, deviation from perfect competition results when insurance products are group-purchased by the employers instead of by the ultimate consumers, the employees; this sort of deviation has tended to aggravate sex discrimination, rather than to ameliorate it. Id. For example, employers continue to charge women more than they charge men for annuities, but as much as they charge men for life insurance. Id. at 529-30. " Benston, supra note 1, at 500-01. 51 The instability of SMDs casts serious doubt on the efficiency of sex as a predictor in the long run. See infra notes 119-54 and accompanying text.
", See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
might refuse to hire blacks altogether. He could claim plausibly that race is an efficient predictor, on the grounds that whites have a lower probability of drug abuse, and that regular testing of employees is expensive. The weakness of Benston's argument that the greater life expectancy of females is an individual trait of a woman employee" 3 becomes readily apparent in this context. Correlation between drug abuse and race could equally be said to make predicted drug usage an individual trait for any black applicant. Under Benston's vision of fairness, it would be unfair to white job applicants if the employer did not maximize the number of drugfree employees by hiring only whites. Benston is not arguing merely that Title VII should permit employers to use efficient predictors; he is arguing that Title VII requires their use. A white applicant, even a white drug addict, would have a claim of racial discrimination against an employer who hired blacks. 5 4 In Benston's view, the most efficient predictor must be taken into account.
5 5
B. The Requirements of the Civil Rights Statutes
Benston makes little effort to reconcile his view of fairness with civil rights law, and his insistence that all efficient predictors must be used has consequences that are wildly inconsistent with the statutes. 56 The claim that Congress wished only to prohibit ems' See Benston, supra note 1, at 506 n.43, 507.
" The white drug addict would be like the physically fit, nonsmoking male in the annuity context. Both claim the advantage of group characteristics inapplicable to themselves. If race were used to predict drug abuse, all white applicants would have a higher expected value to the employer than black applicants, and it would be discrimination to hire the "less qualified" blacks.
5 See Benston, supra note 1, at 505-06, 508-12, 525, 542. Benston states that fringe benefit calculations are very different from hiring decisions, id. at 495, 510, but he offers no reason for this distinction. He also concedes that "'even when sex is strongly associated with a job qualification, at least some members of both sexes are qualified,"' id. at 510 (quoting Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 527), but he says that this point "is irrelevant to insurance," id. The point is not irrelevant, however, because even if sex and mortality were strongly associated, sex-segregated life expectancies would be inaccurate for many individuals of both sexes. Hiring decisions also are based on expectancies about an applicant's value to an employer, and these also will be inaccurate in individual cases. Thus, Benston cann6t hide the absurdity of equating efficiency with nondiscrimination by arbitrarily exempting hiring decisions from his definition.
" Rejoinder to Professor Benston ployment decisions that market forces would rule out even in the absence of the statutes is simply implausible: 5 7 "efficient" discrimination is widespread, and some economists believe that the primary cause of discrimination is the desire to use race and sex as cheap proxies for traits with which they are correlated. 58 An "efficiency exception" would create a massive loophole in the statute and in civil rights policy generally. It also would be unfair to persons who are denied individual consideration in employment decisions, and it is that unfairness to individuals that lies at the core of civil rights policy.
Benston's definition of nondiscrimination is actually a variation on one of the two competing models of equality. Paying a woman periodic annuity benefits smaller than those paid to a similarly situated man is disparate treatment of her as an individual. 9 Paying men and women equal periodic benefits may have a disparate impact on men as a group. 60 Whether to proscribe disparate treatment of individuals or disparate impact on groups is the fundamental choice in civil rights policy. We argued at length in our original article that in the context of sex discrimination in compensation Congress chose to forbid only disparate treatment of individuals. 61 1. Benston's Group Equality Model. Benston's vision of statutory fairness is a strange variation on the group equality model. It is strange because of his emphasis on efficiency, an emphasis that is rejected by most advocates of group equality. 6 2 He insists that the statutes require that average group differences be taken into account when it is efficient to do so, and he concludes that to do otherwise constitutes unfair and illegal discrimination. 6 propensity makes it necessary to determine why an employer has used sex and race in employment decisions. Id. at 255. 57 Benston originally denied that his defense of sex discrimination in insurance is "'a special case of the argument that sex discrimination is sometimes economically efficient,'" Benston, supra note 1, at 511 n.61 (quoting Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 534-35), but he no longer disputes that this is really his argument.
" See authorities cited in Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 528 n.110.
Id. at 508-11. "Benston, supra note 1, at 505-06, 508-12, 525, 542. Benston occasionally implies that he, too, pursues individual equality, id. at 493, 495, 507, 509, but these claims are based on his fallacious assertion that group averages are individual characteristics for every member of the group, see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. He eventually drops the facade Although Benston explicitly assumes that conclusion, he never defends it. In an introductory section entitled "Underlying Assumptions," he assumes that "the law does not prevent employers from distinguishing among individuals with regard to [race, color, religion, sex, and national origin] as long as the distinctions are demonstrably germane to the tasks for which a person is employed and do not mask otherwise illegal discrimination. 6 4 He "base [s] this assumption on a recognition that individuals naturally differ and that some of these individual differences may be related to race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. ' 6 5 Thus, "demonstrably germane" does not mean relevant in and of itself; it means statistically associated. And "otherwise illegal discrimination" apparently means irrational or self-interested bigotry. 6 A subsequent section on the statutes incorporates and extends this assumption; he ultimately insists that not to take race or sex into account is to discriminate, 67 but nowhere does he offer any analysis that supports the assumption.
He does attempt to support his conclusion about the statute's requirements by citing four other articles," but their authors disagree so much with him and with each other that the citations merely demonstrate his own confusion about civil rights policy. Professors Kimball and Rutherglen give Benston the most support, but we have already responded to their arguments," and Benston makes no effort to rehabilitate or extend their analyses. Moreover, Rutherglen finds group equality attractive only in theory; he abandons the model as unworkable in practice. 7 0 Thus, he rejects Benston's conclusion. 7 1 Benston also purports to rely on Professor Wasserstrom, but Wasserstrom presents a radically individualistic theory wholly inconsistent with Benston's assumptions and conclusion. 7 2 and explicitly compares payouts to groups. Benston, supra note 1, at 517 n.72.
"Benston, supra note 1, at 493. 70 Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 248-56. 71 Benston finds this "difficult to understand." Benston, supra note 1, at 509 n.55. 71 Wasserstrom would judge nondiscrimination policy by whether it helps move society toward "the assimilationist ideal." Wasserstrom, supra note 68, at 615-16. A radical version Finally, Benston cites Professors Freed and Polsby, who collect a disparate set of cases and hypotheticals on sexual privacy, sexual entertainment, dramatic authenticity, grooming codes, and physical safety, 7 " and infer that employment decisions on the basis of sex are justified "where a strong enough efficiency justification is present and where the claim of an individual for individual treatment is weak or diffused. ' 7 4 Their analysis is quite different from Benston's, however, and lends him little support. 75 Benston asserts that the nondiscriminatory ideal requires that race and sex be taken into account, 7 6 but that efficiency considerations can override the ideal. Freed and Polsby say just the opposite. They say that blindness as to sex and race and equal treatment of individuals are the nondiscriminatory ideal," but that efficiency considerations can override the ideal in the case of sex. 7 9 Thus, Freed and Polsby agree with Benston that efficiency is sometimes more important than nondiscrimination, but on the key to his whole position, the choice between the two models of equality, they, too, disagree with him 0 Consequently, his whole article depends on his of the individual model of equality, "the assimilationist ideal" is a society in which sex would be as irrelevant as eye color, sexual preference would be anomalous, and "bisexuality ...would be the norm." Id. at 606. The assimilationist ideal "require[s] the eradication of all sex-role differentiation." Id. One who would eliminate gender distinctions in bed surely would not preserve them in actuarial tables. 73 Freed & Polsby, supra note 68, passim. 4 Id. at 636. 75 A complete response to Freed and Polsby must wait, but the outlines for such a response are clear. We already have analyzed most of the exceptions to sex-blindness on which they rely, see Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 524-25, as well as their general efficiency exception, id. at 533-35; see also supra text accompanying notes 48-55. We also note the gulf between their scattered data and their sweeping generalizations.
7' Benston, supra note 1, at 493, 494 n.23, 505-06, 508-12, 517, 525. 7 Id. at 498-501, 512, 532 n.135. 78 Freed & Polsby, supra note 68, at 588, 622-23. 1' Id. at 588-89, 613-24, 630. " This conceptual disagreement is not merely theoretical; it has several important implications. Benston believes that the employment discrimination laws require gender-specific actuarial tables. Benston, supra note 1; at 505-06. Freed and Polsby would merely permit them as an option. Freed & Polsby, supra note 68, at 623-24, 630. Benston would apply his group-based model of equality to race as well as sex. Benston, supra note 1, at 511-12.
Freed and Polsby believe that nothing can override the individual model of equality with respect to race. Freed & Polsby, supra note 68, at 615. Benston believes that any correlation, however slight, between the trait predicted and race or sex requires employers to take race or sex into account, unless it is too costly to do so. Benston, supra note 1, at 498-501, 512. Freed and Polsby would allow sex to be considered only when the employer can prove that "the advantage of using sex as a decision criterion is substantial." Freed & Polsby, supra note 68, at 614. Finally, Freed and Polsby base their arguments on the bona fide occupational qualification exception to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976), which they
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own bare assumptions, and our showing that the statutes require equal treatment for individuals, rather than for groups, remains unrebutted.
2. The Individual Equality Model. With respect to insurance fringe benefits, the individualist model of equality requires that insurers calculate life expectancies and pay benefits without regard to sex; a woman and a similarly situated man should make the same payments and receive the same benefits. Race and sex cannot be used as proxies for some other variable-such as longevity-even if it is efficient to do so. 8 ' In our original article, we reviewed the reasons for this stringent prohibition on the use of race and sex as predictors, 82 and one of us since then has analyzed those reasons in greater detail. 8 3 Because sex and race are immutable, irrelevant to distinguishing between otherwise identical individuals, and historically abused as classifiers, any use of race or sex to predict employment-related traits is forbidden. 4 Whenever rabe or sex is used as a predictor, some individuals are disadvantaged because of a stereotype that is true of others, but not of themselves. 8 5 Benston does not claim that employers have based annuity decisions on sex inadvertently. They do it intentionally, and Benston vigorously defends their right to continue that practice. Rather, his claim is that employers have a legal justification for making insurance fringe benefit decisions on the basis of sex. 8 The statute recognizes no such justification, however, other than the bona fide o6 cupational qualification defense, 7 which plainly is not applicable here. 88 Whatever the merits of Benston's justification argument, it concede only applies to job qualifications. Freed & Polsby, supra note 68, at 631. They diffidently suggest that a more general efficiency exception that would include compensation might be implied, and conclude that if that notion were to be rejected, Manhart was correctly decided but should be legislatively overruled. Id. In contrast, Benston confidently asserts that Manhart was wrongly decided. Benston, supra note 1, at 492. He relies not on any statutory exception, but on his definition of the discrimination prohibited by Title VII, I" Benston initially seemed to acknowledge that these three facts bolster the argument for stringent prohibitions on the use of race and sex as decision criteria. Benston, supra note 1, at 509-11. In his response, he shifts to the position that sex and race are no different from any other predictive variables. Benston, supra note 11, at 250, 254, 258, 263 has nothing to do with intent. Employers intend to do exactly what they in fact do, which is to pay smaller periodic annuities to women than to men. Discriminatory intent is incontestably proven whenever there is an explicit sexual classification. The "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" mandated by the case law s " must be a reason other than sex, not an asserted justification for a decision based squarely on sex. Because sex is an explicit criterion in sexdistinct mortality tables, use of such tables in the calculation of fringe benefits violates the applicable civil rights laws.
II. AN UPDATE ON THE DEMOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
Every individual has a right not to be treated as the average member of his sex or race. Even if part of the SMD is biologically caused, it does not follow that a man and a woman who differ only by sex will have different longevity. To prove that, Benston must identify some genetic or biological difference that affects every member of a sex and that affects the longevity of every individual equally. 90 Only then would it be possible to say of two persons, identical except for sex, that one would live a specific number of months or years longer than the other. 9 1 No one, however, has offered any evidence of a factor that uniformly affects the longevity of every individual on the basis of sex. Indeed, both sides now agree that the argument over a genetic or biological advantage is legally irrelevant. 9 2 Manhart's critics have used such biological arguments rhetorically to bolster the appeal of their efficiency and fairness claims; rhetoric aside, however, Kimball and Benston largely have conceded our evidence that the SMD has varied by century, by country, and by region and state within the United States. 9 3 They also concede that a predictor is efficient only if past :9 See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981 If such a causal connection were to be established, there might be an arguable justification for taking the SMD into account in the calculation of annuity premiums and benefits. Even then, however, there would be some justification for spreading the differing costs of longevity over the whole population, just as Congress spread the cost of pregnancy in employer-sponsored health and disability insurance. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981). The analogy is imperfect because maternity does not affect every woman equally.
92 Compare Benston, supra note 11, at 267 with Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 538-39 and supra notes 56-84 and accompanying text. 93 The data that demonstrate this variation appear in Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 542-49. For the concessions, see Benston, supra note 1, at 526; Kimball, supra note 38, at 918-20. Despite Benston's unsupported hints to the contrary, see Benston, supra note 1, at 500, we previously have shown that this variation is not due to mere shifts in maternal mortality, Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1983] correlations persist throughout the period in which the predicted event could occur. 9 4 We disagree, however, on three related issues: the strength of the evidence for a biological difference in longevity after age one, the stability of the SMD over the time span that Benston believes is relevant, and the validity of assuming that today's SMD will prevail in the future. Benston's own data undercut his argument; they indicate a fluctuating correlation between sex and mortality in the past. 5 Data more recent than his confirm that the relationship between sex and mortality continues to fluctuate, particularly for persons aged fifty and older. 9 Such an unstable SMD means that sex is not even a reasonable predictor of the longevity of groups.
A. The Biological Difference in Longevity
Research has shown that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the relative magnitude of any biological component of the SMD. e7 The researchers who conclude that there is a biological component believe it to be small,"' and our critics have acknowl-544-45, 552-54; see R. RETHERFORD, THE CHANGING SEX DIFFERENTIAL IN MORTALITY 59-69 (1975). We agree with Kimball that infant mortality is markedly higher for males, except where female infanticide is tolerated, compare Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 544 with Kimball, supra note 7, at 113, but both sides also agree that infant mortality is of little concern in the pension context, see Benston, supra note 1, at 526. 94 Benston, supra note 1, at 513; see Kimball, supra note 7, at 108; Kimball, supra note 38, at 919. 218-19 (1965) , to the effect that females are better constructed genetically than are males. Benston, supra note 1, at 520. He omits Scheinfeld's statements in the same passage that environment has an "important, if not predominant, influence... on the causes of death in the two sexes," A. SCHEINFELD, supra, at 220, and that "[u]ndoubtedly, environmental factors play a growing part in creating most of this enormous disparity [in mortality] between the sexes after early childhood," id. at 218. If Scheinfeld places somewhat more emphasis on genetic causes than we do, that simply may reflect his lack of access to the vast body of research compiled since he published his text in 1965. Our earlier article alone cited at least 65 data sources and research studies published since 1965. See generally Briimayer, Hekeler, Laycock & edged the existence of the most telling evidence of a substantial environmental influence on the SMD-its great variation over time and space." 9 To assess the importance of biological causes, one line of research attempts to control for environmental factors. Among the earliest of these studies was Madigan's study of Catholic nuns and Brothers, 10 0 which Benston discusses in some detail. 101 As we previously noted, more recent studies have concluded that Madigan's research design was flawed by the fact that the Brothers had access to liquor and cigarettes. 1 0 2 Benston's efforts to rehabilitate Madigan's study 0 3 with speculations about the Brothers' smoking habits are unsuccessful. Benston compares the life expectancy of Brothers to that of male smokers, male nonsmokers, and the male population in general in order to show that the Brothers could not have been smoking enough to invalidate Madigan's results. 10 4 The most obvious flaw in this analysis is its circularity: Benston starts with Madigan's results (the mortality experience of the Brothers), uses them to infer that smoking must have been relatively controlled, and uses that conclusion to infer that Madigan's results must have been valid. If we already knew the "natural" relationship between the longevity of the nuns and Brothers, we could draw inferences about their environment from Madigan's results. Likewise, if we knew their environment, we could draw inferences about their "natural" longevity. But we cannot infer both without knowing either, which is what Benston attempts to do. 10 5 Sullivan, supra note 2, passim. Moreover, most of Scheinfeld's data that suggest a genetic component in the SMD relate only to infant mortality. A. SCHEINFELD, supra, at 219 (Table  A close reading of Madigan's study suggests that other environmental factors were also at work. For example, young Sisters had higher mortality rates in the first two decades of this century than did either Brothers or native-born white women of similar age.' Both Madigan and Benston surmise that this higher death rate could have been caused by tuberculosis in the convents. 1 0 7 The Sisters who survived this unhealthy environment were apparently hardier or more resistant to disease than the Sisters who had succumbed. It is these hardy survivors whose later mortality experience was so much better than that of the Brothers, and indeed, better than that of the white female general population. 0 8 The mortality experience of these individuals proves nothing about women in general.
More to the point, a group of more recent studies have attempted to control for environment. When at least some important environmental factors are controlled, the SMD for the group studally, a difference of 1.6 years. (These data were interpolated from Madigan, supra note 100, at 213 (Table 1) . Madigan's data reflected life expectancies for Brothers at ages 25, 35, 45, etc. Two-tenths of the difference in mortality between age 35 and 45 were subtracted from the expectancy for age 35 to produce the life expectancy for a Brother at age 37.) In 1959-64, the life expectancy for nonsmoking males at age 37 was 39.9 years, compared to 37.2 years for the male population generally, a difference of 2.7 years. Benston, supra note 1, at 523 n.94 (citing R. RETHERFORD, supra note 93, at 75 (Table 14) ). Thus, the Brothers had a longer life expectancy than the white male population, but not nearly as much longer as that of nonsmokers. Moreover, at ages 65 and over, which Benston insists are the ages that matter the most for purposes of annuity benefit calculations, Benston, supra note 1, at 517, 526, the Brothers' life expectancy was shorter than the white male population's. Madigan, supra note 100, at 213 ( Table 1) . This crossover-the fact that the young Brothers had a longer life expectancy than the population and the older Brothers a shorter one-itself suggests that an important environmental factor was at work. Moreover, Benston's data on per capita national consumption of cigarettes, Benston, supra note 1, at 523 n.94, tell nothing about smoking habits among the Brothers. 106 Madigan, supra note 100, at 216 ( Table 3) . 107 Benston, supra note 1, at 521 n.87; Madigan, supra note 100, at 217-18. 108 In every cohort that could be traced to age 65, the Sisters were survivors of a group that had had higher mortality than Brothers of similar age: Decades in which that cohort Decade in which cohort had higher mortality among was age 65-74 nuns than among Brothers ied has been substantially smaller than that for the general population 0 9e Such studies have been conducted on nonsmokers, 1 1 0 Seventh-Day Adventists (for whom smoking and alcohol are prohibited),"' Mormons (for whom alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine are prohibited),"" 2 and alcoholics (who, regardless of sex, have similar habits of heavy drinking and smoking)." 3 Even Madigan's data show that for more than half of the age groups and decades studied, the SMD between nuns and Brothers was smaller than that for the population generally."" None of these studies controls for all possible environmental influences, and therefore they do not measure completely the relative influence of biological and environmental factors. Such a perfect measure probably is impossible, but the growing body of research suggests that environmental and behavioral factors predominate. Even Benston acknowledges Professor Waldron's conclusion, after her review of 163 scientific papers, that behavioral differences are more important than are biological differences in their effects on life expectancy." 5 B. Stability of SMDs Over Short Periods Benston argues that, in establishing the stability of the SMD for pension purposes, the relevant period is the fifteen to twentyfive years that elapse between retirement and death."" His own 10, I. Waldron, supra note 97, at 22-23. 110 
Hammond, Smoking in Relation to the Death Rates of One Million Men and
Women, 19 NAT'L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPH 127, 166-69 (1966) ; Waldron, Why Do Women Live Longer than Men?, 10 Soc. SCL & MED. 349, 350 (1976) PROBs. 365, 381-82 (1980) . 114 This was true for all ages in 1900-19, for ages 15 and 25 in 1920-29, for age 15 in 1930-39, and for all ages except 55 in 1940-49. Madigan, supra note 100, at 213 ( Table 1) . Even for the pooled data for 1900-54, the Sister/Brother SMD was smaller than the national white SMD at ages 15 and 25. Id. at 214 ( Table 2) . Analyses of ratios of life expectancies, id. at 213-14 (Tables 1 & 2) , and differences and ratios of mortality rates, id. at 216 (Table 3) , produce similar results. Benston reaches a different conclusion by omitting all ages under 65 and the decade before 1910. Benston, supra note 1, at 521-22. Thus he examines only the ages that are distorted by the survivorship effect described supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
'1B Benston, supra note 1, at 523 (citing Waldron, supra note 110, at 358) . 126 Id. at 517, 526.
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data, however, show instability over this period. Table B contains the data Benston cites. 117 Benston notes that between 1949-51 and 1975 the SMD at age sixty-five increased "only" 2.2 years," 18 but this is from a base of 2.2 years and thus represents a 100% change. 119 Between 1939 and 1959 there was a 93% increase; between 1949 and 1969 there was a 77% increase; between 1959 and 1979 there was a 52% increase. In the short period from 1969 to 1979, there was a 13% increase. Even during the last few decades, 1" Id. at 527 (Table 4) . We have extended the periods and cited the original sources from which his data are derived.
118 Id. at 526. 119 Of course, it is 100% of a small initial difference, but the proponents of segregated tables claim it is important to predict such small differences. Id. at 498-500. As we have said already, "the magnitude of potential errors is enormous in proportion to the difference being predicted." Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 559 (footnote omitted).
[50:222
Rejoinder to Professor Benston controlling for age and race within a small part of the human life span, there is little sign of stability in the SMD. 12 0
Unable to demonstrate that the SMD itself is stable, Benston claims that changes in the SMD are predictable. He states that after 1921, the SMD at age sixty-five was "always increasing by about the same amount per decade. 12 1 The data in his Table 4 , however, do not support that assertion; during the decades since 1921, there have been two increases of half a year, two of seventenths of a year, and one of a full year. 1 22 This last change is 100% larger than the earlier changes. In the two pre-1921 decades that Benston excludes from his analysis, he reports that the SMD at age sixty-five declined by two-tenths of a year. 23 Benston's table omits data for the years 1971-79 that show more evidence of instability. The SMD at age sixty-five jumped half a year between 1969-71 and 1975; it fluctuated with no net change from 1975 to 1979.124 Thus, the rate of change in the SMD appears as unstable as the SMD itself.
Finally, Benston errs in asserting that only the retirement-todeath period is of interest in the pension context. 1 2 5 The number of survivors to age sixty-five is also important, because that is the denominator in estimating life expectancy. 2 As Table C shows, even within a short period, there is also considerable variation in this datum. Between 1959 and 1969, the number of men who could 110 Benston attempts to minimize the appearance of instability by netting out offsetting changes. Benston, supra note 1, at 527 (Table 4 ). If the decline in the SMD from 1910 to 1920 is counted as a change, rather than as offsetting a later change in the opposite direction, the cumulative change in the SMD between 1900 and 1971 is 3.6 years. Benston's figure is 3.2 years. Id. 121 Id. at 527. 22 Id. (Table 4 ).
1 Id. 431, 442 (1971) .
Another reason, overlooked by Benston, why mortality during the employment years is important is that persons who die during those years will have contributed to the fund but will not draw a pension. In most or all defined contribution plans this is irrelevant, because the dead employee's contributions are refunded in the form of a death benefit or a survivor annuity. In defined benefit plans, however, employees who die before retirement often forfeit their contributions to the fund. Alternatively, their survivors may receive an annuity whose value exceeds what could have been funded by the worker's prematurely terminated contributions. Either way, the plan's actuaries must take account of preretirement mortality.
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be expected to reach age sixty-five actually decreased slightly; between 1969 and 1979, it increased by nearly 10%; between 1969 and 1975, there was a jump of more than 6%. As we noted in our earlier article, the early 1970's saw a large and unpredicted decline in male mortality. 127 The number of female survivors also increased between 1969 and 1975, but by less than 3%. The numerator for life expectancy at age sixty-five is the total number of person-years of remaining life at that age. 12 As reported in Table D , during the nineteen years between 1960 and 1979, this figure increased by 21.5% for men and 23.9% for women. During the shorter period from 1970 to 1979, the male increase was 17.6%, larger than the female increase of 13.4%. Thus, for life expectancy at age sixty-five, as well as for the two constituent statistics used to calculate life expectancy, there is little sign of stability, even over as short a time as nine years.
'27 Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 554-56. The unpredicted decline in mortality rates was one of the six major demographic "surprises" of the 1970's. Beale, Six Demographic Surprises of the 1970s, POPULATION BULL., June 1982, at 33, 33. phenomenon that as the overall level of mortality declines and the difference in mortality rates by sex declines, the ratio of those rates rises. 13 4 All but one of Benston's tables are susceptible to the level effect because they compare ratios rather than differences. 13 5 An examination of the differences in rates suggests greater male improvement. For example, between 1979 and 1980, the age-adjusted death rate for women actually increased by nearly 2%, while the same rate for men increased by just under 1%.136 More generally, two analyses of recent mortality rates concluded that the rate of increase in the SMD is slowing, with perhaps a stabilization or decline in the offing. 37 This conclusion was confirmed by a 1982 study that used orthogonal regression analysis, 1 3 8 a technique that can overcome the level effect.
A more analytic method of studying changes in the SMD would be to examine the differences in the leading causes of death The ratio of male to female mortality rates increases over time, although the difference decreases.
We earlier mentioned the mischievous effect of using selective mortality measures such as ratios of mortality rates. Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 542 n.183. We also noted that orthogonal regression might be used, thereby avoiding such problems, id. at 548, and pointed out an illustrative error attributable to the level effect, id. at 554 n.260. of men and women. 1 " 9 We previously have noted the increasing female mortality from lung cancer. 140 A study of deaths occurring between 1968 and 1978, from causes of major importance to the retirement age population, shows that the SMD has decreased for cerebrovascular diseases, ulcers, motor vehicle accidents, and all other accidents. 141 Mortality from automobile accidents has been decreasing for men over sixty-five while increasing for women over sixty-five. 142 Sex differences in death rates from cirrhosis of the liver have decreased for whites, although not for blacks. 1 43 Only for malignant neoplasms (all sites) is the SMD increasing. 14 4 All major causes of death that contribute to the SMD have important behavioral components. 1 4 5 Benston correctly quotes Waldron's statement that these behaviors will be difficult for men to change, 1 46 but he omits her finding that many women now are adopting these behaviors. 1 ' Barring a new infectious disease or a major conventional war, individual behavior is likely to continue to 13' See generally Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 552-54.
140 Id. at 555 n.264; see also Waldron, supra note 102, at 86 (finding that sex ratios have declined substantially in recent years for cancers of the respiratory system). 141 M. McMillen, supra note 138, at 10, 12-13, 20 ( (Table 6) . Note, however, that the male/female ratios of the rates increase for cirrhosis and accidental deaths among whites. Id. at 13, 20 ( Table 6 ). This is another example of the level effect. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
14 Waldron, supra note 102, at 72. The SMD is highest for the seven causes of death with major behavioral components: homicide, suicide, motor vehicle accidents, other accidents, lung cancer and emphysema, which are both closely linked to cigarette smoking, and cirrhosis of the liver, which is related to excessive alcohol consumption. Id.
z Benston, supra note 1, at 523 (quoting Waldron, supra note 110, at 358).
"'
Waldron, supra note 110, at 357. Smoking-related diseases require several decades to develop. A recent Surgeon General's report notes "'the first signs of an epidemic of smoking-related disease among women,"' Sulzberger, Surgeon General Says Lung Cancer In Women Increases Dramatically, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1980, at Al, col. 1, and the proportions of smokers among males and .females age 17 to 24 are now substantially equal, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 129, at 123 (Table 202) . Similarly, between 1976 and 1979, alcohol usage increased faster among women age 12 to 25 than it did among men of the same ages. Id. at 122 (Table 200) be an important determinant of the SMD, and this is one key reason for the unpredictability of the SMD in future years. Even if these behavior patterns were relatively stable, a sex stereotype based on them would be no less a stereotype when applied to individuals it does not describe. The reluctance of some men to change their self-destructive behavior is no reason to impute that behavior to other men.
Benston's major argument on predictability is that the current sex-specific actuarial tables have enabled accurate "prediction" in the past. 1 48 He offers Table 1 1960 to 1967 was "predicted" by 1949, 1963, and 1971 actuarial tables. Two of these pairs of columns, however, have nothing to do with prediction. The 1963 actuarial table was constructed from mortality experience between 1960 and 1967 15 0 -the very period being "predicted." Benston's claim of "almost perfect[]" prediction 51 is based on a comparison of two measures of the same experience. The 1971 columns reflect the actuaries' estimates of how much the 1960-67 experience should be adjusted to account for expected future mortality declines. 5 2 These columns show that insurance industry actuaries thought that the adjustments should be about the same for both sexes, 5 3 but they say nothing about how well those adjustments are working out. Benston's analysis of the 1963 and 1971 data is completely circular and proves nothing.
Only the data in the 1949 columns say anything about how well insurers predicted the experience from 1960 to 1967. They did not predict very well, and, more damaging to Benston's argument, the errors were not neutral as to sex. For seven of the eight age groups he reports, the sex differences in the errors were substantial in comparison to the errors themselves. 475, 486 (1971) .
:51 Benston, supra note 1, at 514. 152 Cherry, supra note 150, at 491-94. 155 Indeed, they used unisex data to predict mortality declines. Id. at 493.
1
For six of the nine age groups reported, the difference between the errors of the two sexes is greater than the total error for the more accurately predicted sex. See Benston, supra note 1, at 515 ( Table 1) . For seven, the difference is half or more of the average of the errors for the two sexes. Id. For example, for age 60-64, the male error was 1%, and the female error 11%. Id. The difference between the two errors was 10%, 10 times the male 
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Rejoinder to Professor Benston 247 Actuarial tables are able to "predict" the future only if the future resembles the past. By definition, a life table is a mathematical model of the current experience of a population; 55 if it is a unisex table, it mirrors the experience of a combined male and female population with no loss of "predictability." When mortality changes rapidly, a life table will be a poor predictor no matter how the data were classified initially. Predicting changes in the mortality of a population is difficult; 156 predicting changes in mortality on the basis of sex is even more difficult. 157 The social security board's life expectancy projections introduced in Benston's response do not even attempt to predict fluctuations in the SMD.15 The projections are based on several alternative assumptions about fertility and changes in mortality.1 5 9 The social security board reports no assumption about the SMD; it applies equivalent rates of change to existing male and female mortality rates.1 6 0 The result is no more than an extrapolation from the present SMD; it is not a prediction about the SMD.
In summary, none of Benston's statistics support his conclusions on these demographic issues. His use of the data is selective, '' and he offers sweeping factual conclusions in areas where conscientious biologists and demographers remain tentative and cautious. No one knows what the future will bring, but that is precisely the point: there is no need to permit insurance industry guesses about future developments in the SMD to override civil rights policy. error and nearly double the average of the male and female errors (6%). Benston's observation that the 1949 tables "yielded almost the same degree of error overall for females and for males," id. at 514, merely reflects offsetting errors among the specific age groups. Because each age group represents a different cohort, however, and each individual insured is a member of only one cohort, the sex bias in the errors is not offsetting for the individual insureds.
155 See Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 541-42. Insurance industry actuaries agree. See Cherry, supra note 150, at 519. '67 The designers of the 1971 Individual Annuity Mortality Table used unisex data to predict future mortality declines, id. at 493, and then applied a 10% contingency factor to provide a margin for unanticipated fluctuations, id. at 494. lusory nature of Benston's vision of fairness. Because sex is a suspect classification, even minor deviations from equality are prohibited. 16 4 If Benston's vision of separate but equal expectancies were to be accepted as a part of civil rights policy, these expectancies would have to be measured very precisely. The patchwork of guess and projection by which the insurance industry predicts future SMDs, largely assuming stability despite the contrary history, does not even approach the necessary degree of precision. Men and women would not get equal expectancies under his system but would obtain mere guesses, with substantial errors that are not neutral with respect to sex. Thus, Benston's vision of fairness is unattainable.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISA-
It is also inconsistent with the much more appealing vision of fairness embodied in the statutes. Sex and race blindness have been the civil rights ideal. Benston's insistence on the efficient use of racial and sexual averages to predict the future of individuals is fundamentally inconsistent with that ideal, and if generally applied, would have consequences that most Americans would find abhorrent. allow for the effects of using alternative predictors, see Hearings, supra, at 156-57 (statement of Douglas Laycock on behalf of the American Association of University Professors). If Benston's high estimates were taken seriously, however, they would tend to show the egregiousness of existing discrimination. Benston claims that correcting this discrimination will transfer wealth from men to women, Benston, supra note 11, at 274-77, but this is true only in the sense that any nondiscrimination statute deprives some class of persons of benefits they have unjustly received at the expense of the now-protected class.
26 Benston gives lip service to the legal notion that sex is a suspect classification, Benston, supra note 1, at 493, but that idea has no apparent impact on his analysis. For example, he equates the unavoidable error in predicting mortality changes by sex with the unavoidable errors in predicting mortality changes at all. Id. at 527. But see supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
